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By I. IRVING PINKEL, SOLOMON WEI S, G. MERRITT PRESTON, and GERARD J. PESMAN 
SUMMARY 
The tendency jor the jet engine i'otor to continue to rotate ajter 
crash pre ents the probability that crash-spilled combustibles 
suspended in the air or puddled on the ground at the engine 
inlet may be sucked into the engine. Studies with jet engines 
operating on a test stand and full-scale crashes of turbojet-
powered airplanes showed that combu tibles clrawn into the 
engine in this way ignite explosively within the engine. Flames 
that could set the major fire appear at the engine tailpipe and 
often at the inlet when this explosive ignition occurs. This 
ignition may occur on the hot metal of the engine interior even 
after the combustor flame i extinguished and the engine rotor 
is coasting to rest. 
Experiment showed that the gas flow through the engine is 
too rapid to permit the ignition of ingested combustibles on the 
hot metal in contact with the main gas stream. Ignition will 
occur on those hot urfaces not in the main gas stream. A 
portion of the engine airflow is diverted for cooling and ventila-
tion to the e zones where the gas moves slowly enough for 
ignition to occur. 
The limited extent of the hot-metal zones that may start a 
fire permitted an approach to inerting the engi'ne that involved 
the simultaneous initiation of the following actions immediately 
upon crash impact: (1) Shut off fuel flow to engine; (2) spray 
coolant (water) on those hot sUljaces found to be ignition source,' 
(3) disconnect airplane electrical ystem at the battery and 
generator. 
The effectiveness of th~'s approach was evaluated by crashing 
airplane powered by jet engines. Pylon-mounted engines 
attached to the wings were used to simulate airplanes with 
expo ed pod nacelles. Fighters repre ented airplane types 
whose engines are contained within the main airplane struc-
ture. The quantity of water required as a coolant ranged from 
9 to 12 gallons for each engine, depending on the engine and 
the length of the attached tailpipe. No fires occurred in six 
crashe in which the inerting system was used. Two airplanes 
crashed without protection caught fire. 
INTRODUCTION 
NAOA r esearch on the origin of crash fires, begun in 1949, 
has been extended to include jet aircraft. The work per-
formed with jet aircraft followed an extensive program with 
piston-engine airplanes (ref. 1) which was documented with 
motion pictures (ref. 2). The objective of this work is to 
learn how turbojet crash fires start and to study means for 
reducing their likelihood. This report discusses the results 
of the study and describes a method developed to reduce 
the probability of such crash fires. 
Since jet airplanes have the same gross configuration and 
assortment of components as piston-engine airplanes, much 
of what was learned about the start of crash fires in piston-
engine airplanes applies to the turbojet. In the jet phase 
of the researeh new elements of the problem, peculiar to 
the jet airplane, were emphasized. These include the jet 
engine, jet fuel, increased fuel quantity, and differences in 
fuel location. Of these new elements, the jet engine is most 
important. Ignition hazards presen ted by friction and 
electrostatic sparks, electrical arcs and sparks, and ail' 
heaters remain su bstan tially the same for pi ton-engine 
and jet airplanes. Some safety advantage is obtained from 
the lower volatility of jet fuels, but some of this advantage 
is counteracted by the increased quantity of fuel and its 
broader disLribution on the airplane. 
In this report interest is centered on the part the turbojet 
engine plays in setting crash fires. Because of the knowledge 
gained about combustible spillage and movement in crashes 
with piston-engine airplanes, this combustible spillage could 
be simulated for a jet engine on a test stand. Therefore, the 
crash-fil'e hazard presented by the jet engine could be 
assessed by test-stand studies. At appropriate times, air-
planes with jet engines were crashed to verify important 
results obtained on the test stand. 
MECHANISM OF TURBOJET-AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE 
The start of a crash fire involves three major steps: 
movement of the crash-spilled combustibles to an ignition 
source, ignitioll of the combustible at the source, and spread 
of fire to the main body of fuel on the airplane. The move-
ment of crash-spilled fu el to ignition zones and the spread 
of the fire were observed in the work with piston engines 
and are reported in detail in reference 1. There remains, 
then, the matter of understanding how the turbojet acts 
as an ignition source. 
In order to observe how crash fires start with jet aircraft, 
two experimental full-scale crashes were conducted with 
tmbojet aircraft having different engine installations. One 
of the aircraft was a 0-82 airplane . The piston engines 
Hormally carried were replaced with either J'35 or J'47 
engines, pylon-mounted to each wing to simulate a bomber-
type engine installation. The airplane with tmbojets is 
shown in figure 1. A fighter-type engll1 e installation was 
I Supersedes NACA Technical ~ote 3973 by I. Irving Pinkel , Solomon Weiss, G. Merritt Preston, and Gerard J. Pesman, 1957. 
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(a) 
(b) 
(a) Front view. 
(b) Side view. 
'FIGURE I.-Jet engines pylon-mounted to wing of cargo airplane. 
represented by an F-84 airplane whose J'35 engine is sub-
merged in its fuselage. 
These cmshes simulated takeoff or landing accidents, 
which occur at low airplane speed where the chance for 
human survival of the crash impact is high. In the ex-
perimental C-82 cmsh, turbojets accelerated the l1irpll1ne 
from rest to a speed of about 90 miles per hour along a 
1700-foot runway. A crash I1butment (ref. 3) I1t the end 
of the runway was arranged to rip off the landing gear, 
while a pair of poles on each side of the wing tore open the 
fuel tanks containing 1000 gallons of JP-4 fuel. 
The airplane as it struck the barrier is shown in figure 
2(a). The cloud of fuel mist (liquid droplets suspended in 
air) that appeared when fuel spillage occurred while the 
airplane was in motion is evident at the breach in both 
wings (fig. 2(b)). R ed dye in the fuel accounts for the 
bright color of the fuel cloud. As the crashed airplane 
slowed, the fu el mist moved forward of the wing and reached 
the air inlet on the left engine (fig. 2(c)). A strong cross 
wind swept the fuel mist away from the engine on the right 
wing . 
Fuel mist ingested by the left engine was ignited some 
where within the engine. The ignited fuel mist produced 
the flames at the tailpipe and inlet shown in figure 2(d). 
These exposed engine flames ignited the fuel spilling from 
the wing (fig. 2(e)) . The flame spread through this fuel to 
the wing to produce the stable fire shown in figure 2 (f). 
The F-84 fighter (fig. 3), carrying its turbojet submerged 
in the fuselage structure, caught fire in a similar crash. In 
this crash the fuel that entered the engine inlet was spilled 
from a fuselage tank adjacent to the engine-inlet duct. 
Arrangements for ensuring the failure of this tank in the 
crash are shown in figure 4. A driving strut was attached 
at one end to the nose wheel strut. The free end of the 
driving strut carried a spear-like tank cutter aimed at the 
fuselage fuel tank, whose wall is adjacent to that of the 
air duct. When the nose wheel strut failed rearward in 
crash, the driving strut cut the duct and tank walls. Fuel 
in liquid form poured in to the ail' duct and was dmwn in to 
the engine. 
A crash of the F-84 is shown in the sequence in figure 
5. Upon passing through the crash barrier the airplane 
flew over a ditch toward rising ground. The fuel spilled 
from the damaged wing tanks in mist form and moved to 
the rear of the airplane (fig. 5(a)), which was traveling 
about 100 miles per hour. When the nose gear collapsed 
upon contact with the ground, the fuselage fuel tank was 
pierced. Fuel poured from this tank into the engine-inlet 
duct. Igni tion of this fuel within the engine provided a 
succession of flame puffs i suing from the tailpipe, one of 
which is shown in figure 5 (b). These flame puffs moved 
into the Wilke of the airplane and continued to burn I1S 
isolated masses. Fuel spilling from the wing was ignited 
by these flames at the rear of the airplane (fig. 5(c)). The 
resulting fire moved forward through the fuel spilling from 
the wing and reached the slowing airplane to produce the 
fire shown in figul'e 5 (d) . 
The fire that occW'l'ed in these crashes of the cm'go l1irpll1Jle 
with externally mounted engines and the fighter with 11 
submerged engine showed that fuel ingested with the engine 
ail' can ignite within the engine. The flames produced may 
reach out of the engine tailpipe and inlet to ignite com-
bustible spilled around the crashed airplane. 
ROLE OF TURBOJET ENGINE IN SETTING CRASH FIRES 
The crash fires ju t described show that the tW'bo jet 
pll1Ys a thrcefold role in setting the crash fires. First, 
because the turbo jet has no propeller to strike the ground 
and stop the compressor and turbine rotation when crash 
OCClli'S, the engine continues to operate. The large air mass 
flow into the engine is drawn from a broad zone ahead of 
the engine inlet. Combustibles spilled into this zone are 
sucked into the engine with this air . This ingestion of 
combustibles is the first step leading to the start of fire by 
the engine. Second, combustibles drawn into the engine 
I1S liquid are well mixed with air by the compressor. Wetting 
of the compressor blades, particularly those of the rotor, 
promotes the evaporation of the liquid combustible in the 
all' . Evaporation is further promoted by the heating of the 
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(a) Airplane contacting barrier. 
(c) Fuel mist entering left engine, 2.5 seconds after 
initial impact. 
(e) Fire spread to fuel mist issuing from left wing, 
2.8 econd after initial impact. 
(b) Fuel-mist cloud, 0.8 second after initial impact. 
(d) Fire at engine inlet and tailpipe of left engine, 
2.6 seconds after init.ial impact. 
(f) Spread of fire, 4.0 seconds after initial impact. 
FIGURE 2.-Development of crash fire in simulated jet bomber. 
4722830-59--2 
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FIGURE 3.-F-84 Fighter airplane used in crash-fire in\'cstigaiion. 
air iJl tbe compressor. The ingested fuel, favorably con-
ditioned for ignition, then moves into zones in the hot end 
of the engine containing combustor flame and metal ahove 
the igllition temperature of petroleum fuels where ignition 
occw·s. Third , the resulting flame propagates out of the 
engine to spread the fire. 
Even if a pylon-mounted engine i torn free in a crash, its 
essential role in eLting fires i uncJlanged. Th normal 
fuel flow to the combustor is cut off upon engine separation, 
but the kinetic energy stored ill the 1'0(01' maintains Lhe 
compressor airflow. The inlC't air velocity remains high 
C'l1ough for abollt.'5 pconds aftr]' combustor fuel cutoff for 
apprrciablr elltrainn1C'nt of pillN[ ('omhustihles with the 
inlrl nil'. The prohability of fuC'J ingC' tioll is increa ed 
,,!Jell the I'l1gllle tumhlC's illto the fuel deposited under or 
(a) Wing-lank (uel spillage , 0.35 second afiPI' initial 
impact. 
(c) Wing-Lank fuel mist, 1.10 econos !tfier initial 
impact. 
FIGURE 4.- chematic diagram of F-84 tank-cutting mechani m. 
behind the airpJaue. 
A turbojet disinLegrating in a crash could scatter hot-
metal parts all d burning combustor fuel into fuel-wetted 
areas. T he resulting fire hazard is obviou and is not con-
sidered a subject for research. Experience gained in experi-
mental era he of turbojet aircraft in thi and related pro-
grams ha shown thaL there is little likelihood that. the 
engine will come apart in a crash impact that is uryivable. 
In no case did Lhe engine break in crashes involving a total 
(b) Flames at engine tailpipe, 0.75 second after 
initial impact. 
(d) Spread of fire, 2.15 seconds after iniiial impact. 
FIG URE 5.-Development of crash fire in jet fighter. 
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of 23 f'ngines, yet some of these crashes produced airplane 
decelerations well beyond human endurance. 
The characteristics of the engine as a SOUTce of ignition 
received the most attention in Lhis work. Understanding 
the ignition process within the engine was considered the key 
to any useful approach to reducing this crash -fire hazard. 
FUEL INGESTION 
An operating turbojet draws its air from a stream tube of 
diameter less than that of the engine inlet when the airplane 
is flying. When the engine is mO\Ting with low forward 
speed on the ground, tbe static pressure at t.he inlet is less 
than atmospheric and the stream-tube diameter is greater 
than the ngine-inlet diameter. This condition exists when 
the airplane slows in crash. This stream tube broadens 
further if the engine comes close to the ground as the airplane 
breaks up. 
Liquid combustibles prayed into areas of low velocity in 
the inlet stream tube may drop to the ground before they 
reach the engine inlet. Liquid suspended in air (mist) 
entering the same zones is drawn into the inlet. Streams 
or jets of liquid combustibles projected into the high-
velocity air within a few inlet diameters of the engine are 
also drawn into the inlet. As the velocity of the inlet air 
decreases with engine rotor speed, the distance at which 
ingestion of these streams or jets occurs shortens corre-
spondingly. 
Liquid fuel may be sucked into the engine from pools of 
fuel on the ground in front of the inlet. If the engine is on 
the ground, this fuel is drawn into the engine with the inlet 
air. If the engine is above the ground, a vortex that some-
times develops at the inlet and extends to the ground may 
raise liquid fuel from the ground into the intake airstream 
(ref. 4). Also, fuel stored in tanks adjacent to engine air-
intake ducts could pour into Lhe duct when walls separating 
th em are breached. 
Evaporation of liquid pools of fuel 0)' fuel from wet,ted 
surfaces is a relatively slow process. This is particularly 
true for jet fuels with violatiIities lower than aviation gaso-
line. Therefore, the vapors emanating from liquid fuel, 
spilled in the zone of influence of the inlet st.ream tube, 
rarely will be sufficient to produce a combustible mixture 
with the large mass airflow into the engine. Usual1y, 
ignitible concentrations of combustibles will enter the engine 
only when liquids are ingested. These liquids may be in 
solid streams or mist form. 
ENGINE IGNITION SOURCES 
The two principal engine ignition sources, combustor 
flames and bot-metal surfaces, are sufficiently different in 
their behavior to merit separate discussion. These difl'er-
ences relate to the time these sources persist after crash, 
the manner in which ignition occurs, and the mode of propa-
gation of the resulting fire out of the engine. 
Combustor flames.-If normal combustor fuel flow 
continues after crash, the combustor flame persists as long 
as fuel remains in the tank. Combustibles ingested with 
the engine in take air are ignited immediately upon con tact 
with this flame. Since tbis ingested fuel enters the com-
bustor through air openil1£:s in its linero which extend to the 
downstream elld of the combustor, the burning of this fuel 
is not completed in the combustor. The fuel continues to 
burn in the tailpipe downstream of the turbine. Exposed 
flames that could start the crash fire might appear at the 
tailpipe exit, particularly if the tailpipe is short. Ignition 
of the ingested fuel-air mixture will occur even if it is some-
what leaner than the conventional lower c.ombustible limit, 
because it is intimately mixed w'ith the combustor flame. 
If the fuel flow to the combustor is cut off by intent or acci-
dent, the main combustor flame is extingUlshed at once. 
However, the fuel manifold contilluPs Lo drain slowly through 
the lower fuel nozzlps to support small adj aeen t resid ual fires. 
These fires were observed in test-stand engine studies through 
windows in the combustor. The flames were visible up to 
8 seconds after combustor fupl shutoff wlwn the engine was 
operated at rated sea-level conditions. The ignition hazald 
provided by these residual flames compares with that of the 
full combusLol' flame. However, tIl(> ingested fuel would 
have to produce mixtures within the conventional combusti-
ble limits for the small residual i1am(>s to produce ignition. 
Flames originating within the engine may also appeal' at 
the engine inlet as observed in figure 2(d). The appearance 
of t.his inlet flame may be explained in the following way. 
Buming of ingested fuel in the combustor flame reduces the 
turbine inlet ga density. A higher pressw'e in the combustor 
is requu:ed to pass the gas through the tUl'bine. When an 
abrupt change in over-all combustor fuel-air ratio is provided 
by the ingested fuel, the pl'eSSUl'e ill the combustor required 
to pass the combustor gas through the turbine may exceed 
the capability of the compressor at the existing rotor speed. 
The compressor flow may sLaH before the turbine can acceler-
at.e the rotor to a speed that will provide the necessary 
pressure. At this moment the combustor flame may propa-
gate upstream through the ingesLed combustible mixture that 
:Slls the stalled comprcssor and exit at the engine inlet. 
Hot-metal surfaces.-If combustor fuel shutoff is provided 
upon crash and residua.! flames are avoided, the hot engine 
metal may be a po ten tial ignitor. Consequen tly, the temper-
atures of characteristic engine parts downstream of Lhe com-
pressor were measured on tcst-sLand engines at locations 
shown in figure 6 for a period following c.ombusLor fuel shut-
off. Thermocouples reading temperaLures on rotating engine 
~A 
i 
,..B,.. C 
I I :- D - E 
0 - 1..,. _ i o __ oco 
00 J 
1
0
-
'-E Turbine wheel 
Skin temperature 
FIGURE 6.- Thermocouple locations on J47 engine. 
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parts were connected to recorders through slip rings on the 
engine shaft. 
~1aximum temperatures obtained with the J'47 and J35 
engines runnillg on the test stand were comparable (fig. 7). 
Temperatures of similar locations in the J30 engine, which 
are not given here, were al 0 comparable to those recorded 
on the J'47 and J35 engines. 
The engine metal temperatUl'es aft of the compressor are 
discussed in detail in appendix A. These temperatUl'e meas-
urements showed that all the metal downstream of the com-
pressor was above the laboratory measUl'ed ignition tempera-
tUl'e of jet fuels and lubricants. These parts were at danger-
ous temperatures for varying periods of time after the com-
bustor fuel was shut off. However , temperature alone is an 
insufficien t measure of the ignition poten tial of a hot surface. 
In contrast with flame ignition , which is instantaneous in 
terms of time in tervals significant in this problem, ignition 
of combustible atmospheres by hot surfaces is not instantane-
ous. An appreciable contact time is required between the 
combustible atmosph ere and the hot surface in order for 
ignition to occur. The contact t ime required for ignitio n 
on hot surfaces has been the subject of some recent experi-
ments . nfortunately , much of the experimental data on 
ignition of combustible atmospheres flowing over hot sUl'faces 
" 'as obtained wi th single-constituen t hydrocarbon fuels under 
conditions that hardly approximate those in a jet engine. 
Some data obtained with jet fuels , however, show the impor-
tant trends and the orders of magnitude involved. 
The r elation between surface temperature and contact 
time r equired for ignition is shown by data given in figure 
8 (a) for JP-4 fuel (refs. 5 and 6 and unpublished N ACA 
data) . Two main trends are evident. (1 ) The required 
con tact time decreases " ' i lh increa ing surface temperature. 
(2) Wh en the combustible atmosphere is at high pressure, 
which exists within an engine during the initial stages of a 
crash , ignition is possible at a lower surface temperature for a 
given contact time. As the pressure decreases to atmos-
1800 I ~ 
1600 11 11\ 
I I 1\ 
u.. 
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a. 1200 E 
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FIGURE 7.- l\Iaximum temperatures of metal component in main gas 
stream of J47 and J35 engines. 
pheric, ignition occurs at higher temperatures for a particular 
contact time. 
The corresponding curves for kerosene and 115/145 and 
100/130 aviation gasolines (refs. 7 and ) show the same 
trends as the Clll'ves for J'P- 4 fuel (:ii.g. 8(b)). The fact 
that a co ntact time of more than 0.1 second is required to 
ignite a combustible atmosphere of JP- 4 fuel on a 1000° F 
surface and a combus tible atmosphere of gasoline on a 1400° 
F surface is important in the problem being: investigated 
herein. 
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A study of the gas velocity tlU'ough the hot zon es of the 
engine in the main gas stream showed that combustibles 
pass through these zones too rapidly to ignite. This is true 
for approximately 20 seconds following engine combustor 
fuel shutoff. After this period, the probability of fuel inges-
tion is qui te low. The engine temperature and velocity 
data used in this study are discussed in appendix B for the 
J35 engine. In these studies the engine temperatu.re and air 
velocity data provided in figlu'es 9 and] 0 were used. Similar 
studies which led to the same result were made for the J30 
and J'47 engines. The method of analysis discussed in ap-
pendix B provides a first appraisal of the possibility of igni-
tion of ingested combustibles by components in the main gas 
stream. 
While the analysis showed Lhe J'30, J35, and J47 engines 
safe in this regard, it is conceivable that, with larger engines, 
ignition on the hot metal in the main gas stream may be 
possible. The longer components of the larger engines pro-
vide a longer transit time for Lhe combustible atmosphere 
moving by. ~Iinimum contact Limes for ignition may then 
exist for components in the main gas stream. The method 
discussed in appendix B is usefnl in deLermining when this 
mayoccur. 
While ignition by hot surfaces is unlikely in the main gas 
streams of the engines studied, there are other zones in the 
engine where hot-metal ignition is likely. The hoL·metal 
ignition zones within the engines studied were found to be in 
those areas where the gas velocity is less than that of the main 
gas stream. A small portion of the engine gas flow is di-
verted to ho t zones in the engine wllPre sufficien t con tact 
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FIGURE lO.-Analysis of ignition probability in J35 combustor. 
time for ignition exists. The quantity of gas diverted is 
sometimes unknown , and the geometry of the flow in the di-
version zones is uncertain. For these reasons the period 
over which these diversion zones were hazardous was difficul t 
to defin e based upon an analysis involving surface tempera-
ture and contact time. 
The ignition zones were identified in test-stand engines by 
the method discussed in detail in appendix C. The technique 
employed involved the use of fuel sprays local Lo the engine 
zone suspected as an igni tion somce. Following engine 
operation at rated conditions for a time sufficient to estab-
lish temperaLUI'e equilibrimn , the fuel flow to Lhe combustor 
was Lmned off and the fuel spray was turned on local to the 
zone under study. The fuel flow was programmed to main-
tain a combustible atmosphere in the zone. If ignition oc-
curred, inerting mC'ans were installed to prevent the ignition 
in subsequent lesls of upEt :eam zones. By starting at the 
downstream end of the engine and proceeding upstream in 
this way, each ignition zone was idenLified and inerted in 
tum. As a final check after all the zones were inerted, fuel 
was injected into the main gas stream to determine whetlHir 
igniLion would OCClli". In this manner, ignition zones were 
found on the combustor liner, transiLion liner, turbine, inner 
cone, and tailcO ll C and tailpipe (fig . ]]). 
Combustor liner: The ignition zone found on the com-
bustor liner was Lhe dome, which lies close Lo the primary 
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FIGURE I I.- Hat-metal ignition sources fOllnd in J35 engine. 
combustion zon<:'. The metal adjacent to the dome is 
heated by the combustor flame and attains llllsafe tempera-
tures in 'spite of thr cooling provided by the adjacent air. 
AI 0, in this region tllr engine air is caused to recirculate by 
design to provide a zone of low transitional speerl and pro-
mote good combustion. 13ot11 the hot metal of the com-
bustor liner adjacent to the dome an(l the rcsidual flames 
previously discussed make this zone particularl.\- hazardolls . 
The size of thi zone is difficult to define, since it depends on 
the air tempel'ature at the compressor outlet, the combustor 
drsign, und the ignitioll characteristics 01 thc combustibles 
sucked into the enginr. 
Transition liner: The oulside surface of the transition 
liller, ,,-hich joins the combustor to the turbine, is unother 
ignition zone. A small qllantit~- of ail' Hows contil1llOusly 
from tlle combustor oyer the outer surIace of thr transition 
liner. Combustibles sucked into the ellgille in let are 
brought to tlte outside slll'face of the liller with this air. In 
some engines this air is dru WIl through tile hollow LUl'bine-
inlrt guidr vanes for cooling. These vanes arc at the same 
high temprraturc as the transition liner and must be coulltcd 
us an ignitioll source in this engine zone. 
Turbine: 'rite cavil,\- containing the turuine \Vlteel is a zonc 
of low gas velocity. The ('ombu tibles suckf'd into the enginr 
inlet ure delivered to each face of the turbinr whed with the 
coolillg air drawn from the lligher compressor stagrs. This 
all' moves slowly (,lIoligh for ignition to OCCllI' on tllr turbine-
wheel faccs and on the inner-cone base diapl'l'agrn. 
Inner conr: Combustibk atmosphrJ'('s delinl'NI Lo the 
tmbine wheel from the compressor can enter thi' interior of 
the inner cone through vent holes. In orne engines these 
vent holes arf' located at the base of the tailcone as shown 
(a) Tailpipe 
IInK1IIIIIII1II1IW1I 
Bose diaph'agm 
FLGURE 12.- J35 luner-cone base diaphragm. 
in figure 12. The plaIl(' of the inner-cone base is parallel 
to thp tlU'bine wheel. Com.bustibles entering the cone 
could ignite on the hot walls of its quiescent inter ior. The 
slight dam.age to the base diaphragm., inclicatrd in the figure, 
followed ignition in the interior. The resulting flame might 
ignitr tIle combustible atm.o ph ere streamillg through the 
engine to produce the dangerous flames at the engine inlet 
and tailpipe sho\YIl in figlU'e 13. 
Tailcone and tailpipe: The ignition zones discusserl pre-
viously were all that were found within these ellgines. 
Experiments showed that fires could also be obtained when 
fuels or lubricants contacted the outside surface of the tai1-
conc and tailpipe. The fire produced by jet fuel on an 
engine tailpipe is shown in figure 14. For engine having a 
pressure ratio of 5 or less. the unsafe exterior surfaces were 
confined Lo the tailcone and tailpipe. 
CRASH-FlRE INERTING SYSTEM FOR TURBOJET AIRP LANES 
If fuel ingestion could be prevented, a study of the engine 
ignition woul(l not be necessary. A review of po sible 
mrtitods and means for employing clo mes at the inlet, 
outlet, or within the engine to prevent fuel ingestion on 
era h indicated little hope for this approach. Unacceptable 
(b) Inlet. 
FIGURE j 3.-Flames is ' uing from engine following explosive ignition of fuel within engine. 
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FIGURE 14.- Fuel ignit ion on tailcone surface. 
weight and complexity were required in the rlosUl'e equip-
ment necessary to meet the stringent specifications of fas t 
actuation and strength to support the pressure d ifferen ces 
developed by the compressor. 
Previous crash research with piston-engine airplanes 
showed that a marked reduction ill the cra h-fire hazard 
could be realized by controlling potential ignition omces 
(ref. 1). Most of the ignition sources carried on the airplane 
are associated with the electrical system aBCI the engine . 
By de-energizing th e electrical system and inerting the en-
gine ignition zones upon crash, most of th e fire hazard is 
overcome. 
The electrical system can be dc-energized by opening the 
generator and batter)- circuits. The armatures of main 
electrical componen ts likely to generate clangerous voltages 
as the)- coast to a stop are grounde(l close to these com-
ponents. In tlli way th e e armatures are brought to a 
rapid stop, and the length of electrical wiring at clangerou 
voltagE's is shortened considerably. fgnition sources as-
socialNI with the cngine consi t of combustor flames and hot 
engin e metal discll sed previo u Iy . 
COMBUSTOR FLAMES 
III crash Lh e combustor flRme can be put out by shutting 
off the combustor fuel flow. R esidual combustor flames can 
be avoided if the fu el manifold can be vented to an over-
board drain at the time the main fuel valve is closed. Drib-
blillg of fuel from the n07.z1es into the combustors is avoided 
in this way. 
HOT ENGINE METAL 
The problem of inerting the hot engine metal was sol veel 
during the search for these dangerolls zones. The method 
employed for locating ignition zones within the engine, 
described in appendix 0, involved Lhe inerting of known 
ignition zones as the search for others proceeded. "Water, 
applied to the clangorous hot surfac('s, was cho en as the 
inel'ting agent becau e its high heat of vaporization made 
pos ible the cooling of" ignition zones with small quantities. 
A blanket of sLeam generated by tbe wa.ter evaporating from 
the bot surfaces inerted these zon s, thus preventing ignition 
while the uriaces cooled Lo safe temperatures. 
The quantities of water requirecl to inert the separate 
ignition zones within th e J 30, J35 , and J47 engin es are 
shown in table 1. These quantities do not represent mini-
TABLE I.- WATER QUA TITlES USED FOR I TERTI G ENGINE COl\IPONENTS 
E ngine 
J30 J35 J.!7 
Interna l eng ine co mpOlwn ts 
'Water Dmation vVater Duration Water Duration 
quantity, of flow , q uantity, of flow, quantity, of flow, 
gal ee gal ec gal see 
Combusto r domes __ 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
O. 25 O. 5-l. 8 3 3 3 3 
TransiLion liners and hollow t urbine-
inlet guide vanes _____ 
- - - - - -
O. 03 O. 5- 1. 8 1 14 1 14 
Turbine wheel and inner-co ne ba e dia-
phragm: 
Rapid flow ____ 
-
- - -
None None 1 5 1 5 
Slow f1ow _____ 
- -
0.89 2. 5 2 30 2 30 
Inner-cone in terioL _____ 
- - -
-
O. 2 2.5 O. 35 39 Nonl' None 
Engine (a irplane installation) 
J30 
ExtC'rnal engine component 
J35 (F- 84) 
J47 Pylon in tallation 
(C- 2) 
';Vater Duration Water Duration Water Duration 
quantity, of flo w, quant iLy , of flow , quantity, of flo\\", 
gal cc gal see gal see 
·2 ·7 Tailcone and ta ilpipe _________________ O. 7 6 b2. 5 b3. 6 2 5 
Total water req uired, gaL __________ 
- - - -
2.07 
--------
11. 85 
- -
\) 
- - - - -
"Taileone. bTailpipe. 
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mums but provide for a margin of safety. The water 'luan-
tities listed cover all of a given class of components. For 
example, the 3 gallons of water for the J35 combustor include 
the eigh t combustors carried on each engine . The time 
duration of the water flow is given as well. 
Combustor liner.-The method of introducing the water 
into ear b J47 combustor is shown in figure ]5. A toroidal 
FIGl'RE 15.-Combuslion-chamber \\'ater spray nozzle (J-li engine). 
water manifold surrounded each fuel nozzle. Eight 0.082-
inch holes on the downstream face of Lhe manifold directed 
water at the combustor dome and its louvers leading into 
the combustion space. A continuous circumferential slot, 
0.020-inch wide, on Lhe perimeter of the manifold provided a 
sheet of water spreading radially. This water was directed 
downstream by the airflow to impinge and wash along the 
outside surfaces of the combustor liner. The 3 gallons of 
water delivered to the combustors of the J35 and J47 engines 
were divided equally among the combustors. The water 
discharge lasted for 3 seconds . 
Transition liner.- Water was delivered to each transition 
liner in a fan-shaped sheet from nozzles arranged as shown 
in figure 16. Adequate cooling was obtained with three 
nozzles for each liner by directing the water at glancing 
incidence to the outside sW'faces of the transition liner. 
One pint of water was discharged onto each transition liner 
of the J35 and J47 engines. 
The water applied to the transition liner was sufficient to 
fill the hollow turbine-inlet guide vanes with steam for the 
14 seconds the water flowed. During this period the space 
was inerted with steam. No additional water for the turbine-
inlet guide vanes was required, since the main gas stream 
through the engine cooled the vanes to safe temperature 
in this time. 
Turbine.-Cooling wo,ter to the turbine Wo,s applied as 
shown in figW'e 17. Several streams of water issued from 
the ring-type water manifold at the hub and spread cen-
trifugally over the rotating wheel. The J35 and J47 engines 
contained an inner-cone base diaphragm that was hot 
enough to be dangerous. Cooling was effected by discharg-
ing an additional gallon of wo,ter over a 5-serond period on 
the downstream face of the turbine wheel through the 
tW'bine cooling-air tube (fig. 17). A portion of this water 
rebounded from the spinning wheel and sprayed onto the 
bo,se diaphragm. 
Becanse the turbine wheel had large mo,ss o,nd thickness, 
reheating of the wheel surface to unsafe temperatures 
occW'red after the applied cooling water was expended . An 
example of the reheating of the hottest part of the wheel is 
shown in figure 18. In early experiments, when 2 gallons 
of water were sprayed over a 2-second period onto the aft 
FIGURE J 6.- Tran. ition-liner water spray system (J35 and J47 engines). 
Transition liner ~, 
Water spray 
manifold 
(fran I facel --
r Turbine-inlet 
guide vane 
Inner 
cone 
FIGURE 17.-Schematic diagram of turbine-cooling system. 
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FIGURE J 8.-Comparison of tur bine-wheel cooling with hort- a nd 
long-duration water prays. 
face of the turbine at the hub, the surface temperature 
dropped rapidly to the boiling temperature of water (curve 
A, fig. 18) . hortly after the water was expended, the 
surface of the wheel reheated bv condueLion from the hot . 
interior. Unsafe temperatures ~bove 600 0 F were estab-
lished in less than 7 iseconds. In order to nvoid reheating 
to unsafe temperatures, the water discharge period was 
extended to 30 seconds. Experiments indicated that the 
quantity of water necessary could be reduced from. 2 to 1 
gallon -for each face of the turbine disk. The wheel temper-
atures obtained are shown by curve B in figure 18. The 
time interval before reheating began was increased from. 3 to 
20 seconds. Reheating to temperatures above 600 0 F 
occurred after 27 seconds, at which time, however, the 
chance for fuel ingestion was remote. 
This problem of reheating must always be considered in 
the use of water for cooling unsafe zones. The chance for 
fuel ingestion by the engine is greatest just before the air-
plane comes to rest in the first 5 seconds after crash impa,ct. 
At this time fuel spilling from torn tanks has its broadest 
distribution forward of the wings in areas adjacent to the 
engines. Reheating after this time is not as serious within 
the engine as it would be on the outside surfaces which 
could be wetted by fuel that continues to drip and flow 
around the engine after the airplane comes to rest . 
Inner cone.-The cavity of the inner cone was inerted by 
diluting the air with steam produced by the evaporation of 
water from spray nozzles within the inner cone . The initial 
water flow rate to the illner-cone cavity should be rapid 
enough to reduce the oxygen concentration within the cavity 
below 10 percent in 1 second. This waS the approximate 
time lati tude that existed between Lhe start of fuel ingestion 
in the engine inlet and the entrance of dangerous amounts 
of fuel into the tailcone. The effectiveness of these arrange-
ments was enhanced by directing the water sprays at the 
openings through which the fuel could enter . In this way 
the steam diluted the ail' local to the fuel entering the inner 
cone and provided protection, while the steam concentration 
developed throughout the cavity. The chamber was main-
tained inert until its walls were cooled to safe temperatures 
by the main gas stream. For engine cavities having the low 
ventilation rates found in the inner tailcone, the quantity of 
water required for protection could be calculated from the 
volume of the cavity and volumes of steam generated per 
unit mass of water . Allowance was made. of course. for 
steam loss due to ventilation. 
For the J 35 engine, which has an inner-cone volume of 5.8 
cubic feet, 0.35 gallon of water was required to provide an 
inert atmosphere. In contrast, the inner cone of the J30 
engine, which has no base diaphragm and contains a volume 
of only approximately 0.7 cubic foot, required 0.2 gallon of 
water to achieve an inert atmosphere. This relatively larger 
amount of water was necessary because of the higher ven ti-
lation rates existing in the open-base inner cone of the J30 
engme. 
Tailcone and tailpipe.-The uniform distribution and 
efficient utilization of the cooling water on the tailcone and 
tailpipe posed some problems. Because the tailcone and tail-
pipe were circular in section and mounted with the axis 
horizontal, an unduly large number of water sprays had to 
be used to obtain complete wetting of the outside surface. 
The tendency of the water sprayed on the tailpipe to form 
thin rivulets reduced the area wetted by each spray. Water 
sprayed on the tailpipe above the equator provided rivulets 
that ran by gravity to the equator where they ch·ipped off. 
Water sprayed on the tailpipe belo~'T the equator ch·ipped 
off the tailpipe a short distance from the impingement area. 
Effective water distribution and wetting were promoted 
bv wrapping a 100-mesh stainless-steel screen around the 
m;tire exhaust system. This screen was spotwelded to the 
tailcone and tailpipe. 'Yater sprayed on the screen pene-
trated to the surface of the tailpipe and tailcone. The 
screen promoted wetting and discouraged the formation of 
rivulets. 
Water distribution over the screen-covered exhaust system 
was provided by a network of flattened tubes mounted axi-
ally in contact with the screen. ,Yater sprayed through 
orifices drilled into the flattened side of the manifold facing 
the tailcone and tailpipe. The discharge orifices were 0.040 
inch in diameter and spaced so that each would distribute 
water over approximately 50 square inches. Additional holes 
were drilled where experiment showed them to be necessary 
to provide uniform wetting. The tubes were nlso covered 
with ribbons of stainless-sLeel screen and spaced around the 
tailcone and tailpipe in o]"drl" lo provide a uniform water 
distribution. Three cir(,ular \Yat!']" manifolds connected the 
tubes to form a single intercollllected unit. This water sys-
tem is shown parLially installed 011 the J·35 tailpipe in figure 
19. Some of the flattened manifolds, which are uncovered, 
• 
Monlfolds covered 
wllh screen 
Flange 
nozzle 
FIGURE 19.-Typical water distribution system for F-84 tailpipe. 
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are visible. The waffled appearance of the screen was pro-
duced by two sets of mutually perpendicular grooves that 
were rolled into the screen. These grooves permitted the 
screen to be tightly wound to the tailpipe and yet allowed 
water Lo flow uncleI' the screen . 
Direct water sprays were provided through orifices and 
nozzles placed on the local circular manifolds in order to 
provide cooling of the massive flange joining the tailcone 
to the engine and the tailpipe to the tailcone. 
The quantity of watpr l'equired for cooling the tailcone 
and tailpipe (table I) depended upon its diameter ancllength 
and the thickness of the metal. For the J35 engine with a 
long tailcone and tailpipe (157 in. ) sized for the F-84 air-
plane, 4% gallons of water were required. Two gallons of 
water were required for cooling the corresponding parts in 
a pod-mounted nacelle with a short tailcone and tailpipe 
(63 in.). 
The total water requirement for protecting J35 and J47 
engines ranged from 9 to approximately 12 gallons depending 
on the size of the tail sections. The J30 engine required 
approximately 2 gallons of water. 
CRASH STUDY OF INERTING SYSTEMS FOR JET AIRPLANES 
Two types of airplanes were used in the study of the use 
of water for red ucing the likelihood of crash fires. Cargo 
airplanes (C-82) were fitted with pylon-mounted engine 
nacelles to simulate a jet bomber with pod-installed engines 
as shown in figure 1. Fighters (F-84) were used to repre-
sent airplanes having engines submerged within their struc-
tures (fig. 3). 
INSTALLATION OF CRASH-FIRE SYSTEM 
The complete crash-fire protection system used in this 
crash study is shown schematically in figure 20. The sys-
tem comprised a water storage and distribution system, a 
shutoff valve for the combustor fuel, an electric switch for 
dc-energizing Lhe battery and generator circuits, and a crash-
actuated switch for turning on the protection system. In 
these tests this switch was exposed on the airplane. The 
switch struck a target at the crash barrier which operated 
Combustor dome 
Crash-activated switch-? 
Electric disconnect 
Fuel shutoff vatve ./ 
Toilcone 
Toiiplpe 
FIGURE 20.-Complete inerLing system installed in F-8~ airp lane. 
Lhe switch sho rtly after major airplane damage had begun. 
'While this arrangement was suited for these experiments, 
more elaborate means would be required for actual airplane 
installations. A comprehensive discussion of initiating sys-
tems for actuating crash-fire inerting systems is presented 
in reference 9. 
In order to ensure that known quantities of water were 
applied at each engine igni tion zone, the water for each zone 
was carried in a separate r eservoir. Compressed gas for 
(a) 
(b) 
(a) Located in wing root of C-82 cargo airplane. 
(b) Secured to H7 engine. 
FIG URE 21.- Water reservoirs. 
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propelling the water was contained in the reservoir. The 
gas space and pressure were designed to give an initial water 
flow rate with a subsequent decline in the aow rate that was 
found experimentally to provide effective use of the water. 
De ign compromises involving reservoir location, length of 
water distribution lines, reservoir pressure, and required 
quantity of water wore made in order to stay within a, O.2-
second time limit (after crash impact) for the application 
of the water at the ignition zone . This time limit was dic-
tated by the nc...·mal lag involved in the functioning of the 
hardware components of the inerting system. Considera-
tions of rate of fuel spread in the crash indicate that it is 
unlikely that combustible atmospheres will contact the en-
gine ignition zones within this short interval of time. 
In three of the crashes of cargo airplanes fitted with 
J47 engines, the water reservoirs were carried in the wing 
root as shown in figure 21 (a). Flexible lines joined these 
reservoirs to the engines. In one crash in which arrange-
ments were made to rip the engine from the wing, the water 
reservoirs were strapped between the engine combustors as 
shown in figure 21(b). 
FULL-SCALE CRASHES 
The first crash in which this inerting system was evaluated 
was conducted with a C-82 equipped with J47 engines. 
Shortly after the airplane passed through the crash barrier, 
the right wing tore free to produce the large volume of fuel 
(a) Fuel mist di charging froIn torn wing, 0.9 second 
after initial impact. 
(c) Pool of fuel left in inlet cowl indicating fu el entry 
into engine. 
mist shown in figure 22(a). Entry of fuel mist into the left 
engine occmred 3.0 second after barrier impact just as the 
airplane began to ground-loop (fig. 22(b) ). The condensed 
water vapor pouring from the engine tailpipe indicated that 
the fire-prevention system was workmg. The pool of fuel 
at the inlet lips of tbo left engine (shown in fig. 22(c) ) 
represents some of the fuel that en Lercd the engine inlet and 
then drained forward when the engine stopped. In spite 
of t,he fuel that entered the engines anrl that which poured 
over the nacelles (fig. 22(d)), nofil'e occurred. No fires 
ocrul'l'ed in two additional crashes conducted under the 
same circnmstances. 
It is evident that pylon-mounted engines on jet airplanes 
may part from the supporting wings in a crash. To deter-
mine whether fire protection could be provided to the engine 
after separation, a crash was arl'anged in which the left 
engine nacelle was torn free. The entire nacelle inerting 
system was built into the nacelle and designed to function 
regardless of the attitude assumed by the nacelle after 
separation from the airplane. 
For this crash special water reservoirs were made that 
would fit in the spa,ces between the combustors on the J47 
engines. Some of the water reservoirs held to the com-
bustors by metal bands are shown in figure 21(b). To 
ensure complete expulsion of the water regardless of the 
nacelle orientation, reservoirs of the type shown in figure 23 
were employed. Each consisted of a steel cylinder with a 
(b) Entry of fu el mi t into left engine, 3.0 seconds 
after initial impact. 
(d) Fuel sp illage on nacelle. 
FIGURE 22.-Crash of C-82 with jet engines equipped with lI1erting system. 
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cartridge 
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Water-fill 
Bladder 
'- Corrugated screen 
FIGURE 23.-Bladder-type water re ervoir. 
rGas 
; valve 
neoprene-fabric bladder insert. W'ater was retained in the 
steel cylinder while the volume of the bladder was filled 
with nitrogen gas at a pressurE' necessary to give the desired 
water discharge rate, \\'hen the outlet valve was opened, 
the bladder expanded , forcing the water to flow. 
The airplane used in the crash in which engine separation 
was to occur differed from the previous airplanes only in 
the changes in the water system, just described, for the left 
engine. A blade rigidly attached to the bottom of the left 
nacelle was arranged to drag through an earth mound at 
the crash barrier and pull the engine from the wing. 
Separation of the engine from the wing is shown in th e 
picture sequence of the crash in figure 24. After separation 
(fig . 24(a)) the engine tumbled in the fuel spraying into the 
(a) 1.3 Seconds after initial impact. 
(c) 3.1 Seconds after initial impact. 
wake of the damaged wing (figs, 24 (b) and (c)) and came to 
rest in the fuel-wetted slide path of the airplane (fig . 24 (d)). 
The plume of condensed water vapor at the tailpipe (fig. 
24(b)) shows that the water iner t ing s~Tstem was actuated . 
No fiTe occurred . 
The crash technique for. the F-84 with protected engines 
was identical with that used in the crash with the unpro-
tected engine discussed in connection with figure 5. The 
crash-fire protection system for the engine was the same as 
that for the cargo airplanes fitted with jet pods. 
The sequence of events following crash was the same for 
the F-84 as for the cargo airplanes. Poles at the crash barrier 
ripped open the wing fuel tanks and produced the fuel mist 
shown in figure 25(0,). Collapse of the nose gear allowed 
fuel from the torn forward fuselage tank to enter the engine 
inlet. Vapor issuing from the tailpipe (fig. 25 (b)) was 
provided in part by the fuel that passed through the engine 
from. the damaged fuel tank adjacent (0 the engine inlet . 
Evaporation of water from the fire protection system con-
tributed a large part of the vapors formed (fig. 25(b)). 
Inspection of the engine after crash showed Lhe telltale clye 
stains left by the red-d)'ed fuel flowing through the com-
pressor (fig. 26). Xo fire occurred. 
A second crash of an F -84 airplane equipped with tIl(' 
fire protection system was eonducted, again with no fire 
OCCUlTing . '''hen the airplane came to rest beyond the 
crash barrier, complete wetting of the airplane by tIlf\ 
red-dyed fuel was observed (fig. 27). 
(b) 1.8 Seconds after initial impact. 
Cd) 4.4 Second afLer in it ia l impact. 
FIG\TRE 24.-Separation of J47 engine from C-82 wing in cra h. 
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(a) Fuel mist, 1.1 seconds after initial impact. (b) Water and fu el vapors issuing from tailpipe, 
3.6 seconds after initial impact. 
FIGURE 25.-Crash of F-84 with J35 inerting ystem installed. 
FIGURE 26.-Fuel-dye stains on J35-engine compressor following F-84 crash. 
FIGURE 27.-Extensive fu el wetting of F-84 following crash with inerting system. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A study of the ignition of combustibles sucked into the 
inlets of turbojet engines having a size and compression ratio 
of the J35, J47 , and J 30 engines gave the following results: 
1. The main gas stream through the engine moved too 
rapidly for ignition to occur on the hot metal within the 
engme. 
2. Ignition may occur on the hot surfaces within the engine 
downst.ream of the compressor in those zones not in the main 
gas stream. For the engines studied, these zones included 
the combustor-liner dome, the transition-liner outer surfaces, 
the turbine-inlet guide vane interior, both faces of the 
turbine wheel, the inner-cone base diaphragm, and the 
interior of the inner cone. 
3. Outside surfaces of the tailcone and tailpipe can 
ignite jet-ellgine fuels and lubrIcants. 
4.. A crash-fire protection system which de-energizes the 
electrical system, shuts off the fuel flow to the engine, and 
sprays coolant (water) over these hot surfaces proved effec-
tive in preventing fires . Fighter aircraft with submerged 
engines and simulated bomber configurations with pylon-
mounted nacelles were used in these studies. No fire 
occurred in the six crashes when the engine fire-prevention 
system was used. Fires did occur in the two crashes in which 
no engine protection was provided. Coolant requirements 
ranged from about 9 to approximately 12 gallons of water 
pel' engine (J35 and J47 engines) depending on the length 
of tailpipe to be cooled. 
LEWIS FLIGHT PROPULSION LABORATORY 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS 
CLEVELAND, OHIO , Jan'ua"1I18, 1957 
APPENDIX A 
ENGINE TEMPERATURE SURVEY 
A first appraisal of the ignition potential of a surface is 
its temprrature. Thrrefore. a complete temperature survey 
of the engine was made in order to determine where tempera-
tures wrre high enollgh to cause ignition of aircraft-type 
combustibles. 
The hot test parts of the engine, whell operated at rated 
conditions, were those which la~c in the main gas stream 
downstream of the compressor. The highest temperatures 
(fig. 7) were measured on the primary zone of t he combustor 
liner, on the bend in the transition liner where the hot gases 
leaving the combustor impinge, and on the turbine-inlet 
guide vanes. Temperatures as high as ]660° and ]740° F 
were found on the transition liner and the ad jacent turbin e-
inlet guide vanes, respectively. The stagnation gas temper-
atu re at tlle moving turbine blades was less than the stag-
nation temperature at stationary engine members in the 
same gas str eam. The tempera ture of the blades was cor-
respondingly lower, being about ]370° F for the hottest 
parts of the blade. The gases leaving the turbine were re-
duced in temperat.ure because of the turbine work that had 
been done. Therefore, the temperature of the inner tailcone 
at location A in figure 7 was about 400° cooler than the 
turbine-inlet guide vanes. The temperature was about 
]350° F at the hottest point of the inner cone and about 
1150° F at its coolest point. 
The largest temperature gradients occurred within the 
combustor (fig. 7) where some metal was in cOlltact with the 
relatively cool combustor-inlet ail' and other metal was 
heated by t.he combustor flfune. The maximum tempera-
tures recorded were about 800° F on the dome, about 15000 
F on the primary section of the com bustor liner, and abou t 
1300 0 F at the outlet. The lower temperatures at the 
combustor-liner outlet were produced by the cooler secondary 
combustor air . 
Engine parts not in the main gas stream were heated 
mostly by conduction. The turbine wheel was the most 
massive engine part heated this way. The radial variation 
in temperature on th e surface of the turbine wheel, shown 
in figure 28, resulted from the fact that the beat conduction 
was from the wheel rim to the relativelv cool hub. The 
data shown were obtained with the engine "operating at rated 
sea-level conditions. The turbine-wheel surface temperature 
varied from approximatel), 980 0 F at the rim to about 605 0 
F at a point midway between the rim and hub. Cooling 
air from the compressor applied to the hub to protect the 
engine bearings maintained this temperature pattern. 
The inner-cone base diaphragm, lying opposite the turbine, 
was also heated by conduction. In general, the temperature 
decreased from the rim toward the diaphragm center, which 
also received some cooling by the air applied to the turbine 
hub. 
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FIGURE 28.-Maximu m temperatures recorded on J47-engine turbine 
wheel. 
·When the fuel. flow to the operating engine combustor was 
shut off, the engine parts declined in temperature. Those 
components which lay in the main gas stream cooled more 
rapidly than those which did not. This rapid decline in 
temperature was due to the cooler air now flowing through 
the engine and the generally low heat capacity of these parts. 
A history of the temperature of engine parts lying in the 
main gas stream is shown in figure 29 . Fuel shutoff occurred 
at zero second, and the temperatures indicated were th e 
maximum recorded anywhere on the component at the time 
noted. The hottest section of the combustion-chamber liner 
cooled from ] 500 0 to 600 0 F in 24% seconds. It took over 
30 seconds for the transition-liner temperature to decline 
from ]6600 to 600 0 F. In 30 seconds the turbine-inlet guide 
vane temperature dropped from a maximum temperature of 
17500 to 645 0 F. The rotating turbin e blade temperature 
fell from 13700 to 600 0 F in 16 seconds. Inner-cone skin 
temperatures declined from 13500 to 6400 F in 30 seconds. 
Engine parts not located in the main gas stream declined 
in temperature at much slower rates (fig. 30) . The hottest 
part of the turbine wheel was initially at 980 0 F and dropped 
only 1000 F in 30 seconds after fuel flow to the engine had 
stopped. The turbine wheel remained above the ignition 
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FIGURE 29.- History of maximum skin temperatures on engine com-
ponents in main gas streams. 
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FIGURE 3D.-History of maximum skin temperatures on turbine disk 
and inn er-cone base diaphragm. 
temperature of JP-4 fuel for 30 minu tes after the engine 
was shut down. The large mass of the turbine disk con-
ti'ibuted to its slow cooling rate. The inner-cone base dia-
phragm exhibited the same slow rate of cooling. Its maxi-
mum temperature was 9] 0° F and cooled only approximately 
1150 F in 30 seconds. 
Experimental crashes conducted with piston- and jet-
engine airplanes showed that fuel mists that might be drawn 
into the engine inlet exist during the first 15 seconds after 
impact with the barrier. In this time the airplane deceler-
ates to a stop and the wind clears the fuel mist from the 
crash zone. During this hazardolls period these engine tem-
perature data show that practically all the metal downstream 
of the combustor inlet is above the laboratory measured 
ignition temperature of jet fuels and hydrocarbon lubricants. 
External sUl'faces of the tailcone and tailpipe were the 
only unsafe zones found in engines with compression ratios 
of 5 01' less. Airplane combustibles that con tact this section 
of the engine can ignite. In engines of higher compression 
ratios unsafe engine case temperatures may extend down-
stream from the last compressor stages. Temperatures must 
exceed 600 0 F for ignition to occur readily on the engine 
case, because it is moderately ventilated. This fact was 
established by many ignition trials on the external engine 
surfaces. 
Temperature measurements made on the external skin of 
the J47 engine (fig . 31 ) indicated that the tailcone and tail-
pipe temperatures remained above 600 0 F for more than 30 
seconds after the fuel to the combustor was shut off. Tem-
peratUl'es of the engine case upstream of the tailcone and 
tailpipe were usually below 600 0 F (fig. 32). Although the 
turbine case reached a maximum temperature of 600 0 F and 
remained so for 10 seconds after the fuel was shut off (fig. 
31), no ignitions were experienced here. 
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FIGURE 32.- Maxjmum external skin temperatures on J47 engine. 
APPENDIX B 
PRELIM INARY EVALUATION OF PROBABILITY OF HOT-SURFACE IGNITION 
The data on contact time required for ignition (fig. 8) 
can be used to obtain an approximation of the probability 
of hot-metal ignition of combustibles sucked into the engine 
inlet. The engine metal temperatures are known from the 
measurements given in figures 29 and 30. The contact 
time can be compu ted from the known mass airflow through 
the engine (fig. 33). From the airflow data for the J35 
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FIGURE 33.-Mass airflow after combustor fu el has been stopped . 
engine and the engine geometry, the local air velocity through 
the engine upstream of the turbine inlet was plotted and 
appears in figure 9. Velocities were calculated only at the 
engine stations marked on the sketch. Each line connecting 
the symbols provides the velocity distribution through the 
18 
engine at the time indicated. It is interesting to note that 
at 3 seconds after fuel shutoff the velocity at the compressor 
exit was slightly higher than at the compressor inlet. This 
was due to the fact that the turbine-inlet total temperature 
had fallen to the point where it caused a large drop in 
compressor-exit static pressure. The lower static pressure 
was the dominant influence on the speedup in airflow. 
This analysis does not consider the increase in contact 
time resulting from recirculation of gases in the combustor-
dome area or approximately the first 30 percent of the com-
bustor. However, the contact time available in the aft 70 
percent of the combustor might be considered conservative, 
since the indicated contact time was based on the total 
length of the combustor. A required contact time may be 
picked from the data in figure 8(a), if the entire combustor 
liner is considered to be at the maximum temperature 
shown in figure 29. A crude analysis of this type for the 
first 7 seconds after fuel shutoff is shown in figure 10, which 
indicates that the gas stream moved through the combustor 
liner too quickly to allow a sufficient contact time for ignition 
from the hot metal. Ignition is considered likely when the 
available contact time equals or exceeds the required con-
tact time. 
A similar analysis for the other engine components showed 
that the contact time of the main gas stream in each com-
ponent was too short for ignition to occur. This analysis by 
components was based on the assumption that the fuel-air 
mixture in contact with the hot metal in passage through 
one component is no longer in contact in passage through 
the next. 
APPENDIX C 
METHOD OF LOCATING IGNITION ZONES WITHIN ENGINE 
Inspection of most turbojets shows that the engine interior 
is divided into well-defined cavities, some of which are in 
flow communication. The airflow direction through these 
cavities is also well defined, so that they can be considered 
to be arranged in order. Each can be recognized to be up-
stream or downstream with respect to another. For this 
reason each of the cavities could be explored separately by 
the following technique for the ignition hazard it presents. 
The ignition hazard presented by each cavity was studied 
by installing a fuel spray system in each cavity to produce 
a combustible atmosphere as desired. A separate system 
was also installed to apply cooling water to the hot surfaces 
in the cavity or to provide a water spray in the cavity space. 
The engine cavity farthest downstream, the inner cone, 
was studied first . The arrangements used for the J30 
tailcone are shown schematically in figure 34. A fuel system, 
Water spray 
FIGURE 34.- Typical equipment u ed to Etudy ignition hazard (J30 
inner taiJconc). 
consisting of a single tube and nozzle, was arranged to spray 
fuel in measured quantities into the cavity of the inner cone 
to produce a combustible atmosphere. In addi tion, three 
water spray nozzles were installed facing the upstream di-
rection. Since the J30 engine has no base diaphragm, the 
downstream face of the turbine wheel must be taken as a 
bounding surface of this cavity. The upstream water nozzle 
was arranged to pray water on the turbine wheel to avoid 
ignition from this source. 
In this study of internal ignition zone the engine was run 
at rated conditions until temperature equilibrium was e -
tablished. The fuel flow to the combustor was stopped, and 
0.2 second later the fuel spray in the inner-cone cavity was 
turned on. Ignition of this fuel occurred. The process was 
repeated with increasing intervals between engine combustor 
fuel shutoff and the beginning of fuel spray into the inner-
cone cavity. Ignitions were obtained up to 20 seconds 
after the combustor fuel was shut off. 
Following this evaluation of the inner-cone interior as 
an ignition hazard the runs were repeated, but this time the 
water sprays were also turned on with the fuel spray in the 
inner cone. Initially, sufficient water was used to ensure 
absence of ignition. By progressively reducing the water 
quantity in repeated runs a minimum water requirement 
was established below which ignition would sometimes occur. 
The next upstream ignition zone is the cavity of the engine 
cont.aining the turbine wheel. In order to provide positive 
iden titication of t.he ignition surfaces in the turbine-wheel 
cavity, a fuel spray was installed to fill the cavity with a 
combustible atmosphere. Runs were made similar to those 
described for studying the inner cone. The water spray 
system in the inner cone was always u ed to ensure that 
no igni tion would occur in this zone. Repeated runs were 
made in which fuel was sprayed into the turbine-wheel 
cavity following fuel shutoff to the engine combustor. 
Evaluation of the smallest quantity of cooling water for 
the turbine that was required to prevent ignition was ob-
tained in the manner described for the inner cone. These 
quantities may be influenced by the method of water dis-
tribution employed. In order to provide a margin of safety 
for crash experiments, quantities of water above Lhe minimum 
were u ed. These are tabulated in table 1. 
Each of the engine cavities was studied in turn by pro-
ceeding upstream in th is way. The zones that presenterl 
ignition potential were identified and inC'rted. 
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